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This paper investigates the role of price advertising in a market where con-
sumers are imperfectly informed about prices. We consider a monopolist whose
demand rlcpcuds on prirc a.nd advt~rtising expenditure. This dernand Cunction is
derived from optimizing behaviour of consumers. Uninformed consumers may pay
a cost to visit the sellw and obtain prire information. Advcrtising enables thc
monopolist to increase the number of informed consumers. In equilibrium the
uninformed consumers form rational price expectations and the seller necessarily
adopts a random pricing and advertising strategy. We show that the feasibility of
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librium advertising lrvel is less than socially efficient. Finally, we derive some
comparative statics results.
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1 Introduction
The goal of this paper is to investigate the role of price advertising in markets where
buyers have irnpi~rfe,ct inforn,at.ion about prices. We consider a monopolistic seller whose
dernand is a functiou o[ price and advertising. 1'hia demand funetiou in derived from
optimizing behaviour on t.he part of consumers. Some consurners cannot directly observe
the seller's price quotation. In principle, there are two ways by which these consumers
may obtain price information. First, consumers may find out the price by visiting the
seller. Second, the seller may increase the fraction of informed consumers through price
advertising. In either case tkrere is a cost to improving information. Going to the store
is costly for the buyer, ancl the seller has to spend resources on advertising. We study
the monopolist's pricing and advertising strategy in such a rnarket when the uninformed
consumer's have rational expectations about prices.
[n their seminal paper on advertising, Dorfman and Steiner (1954) postulate a de-
mand function that depencls on price and advertising expenditures. The optimal price-
advertising combination is Lhen obtained írom the first-order conditions for profit maxi-
mization. This approach does not explicitly take account of rational consumer decisions.
When consumers do not enjoy advertising per se, it remains unclear why demand is
affected by advertising. in particular, this feature makes their model inappropriate for
welfare analysis. The assumption of imperfect price information allows us to overcome
these difiiculties by explicit.ly modelling thc impact of advertisiug on demand. It Lurns
out that this reformulation of the Dorfman-Steiner model generates some features that
are not present in the `reduced-form' approach. For instance, the seller's optimal deci-
sions cannot sirnply be decluced from the first-order conditious for profit maximization.
The reason is thaL profits are not jointly concave in price ancl advertising expenditure.
This fact underlies an important property of the market outcome, namely tl,at the
seller's strategy must involve randomization. In equilibriurn the monopolist stochasti-
cally chooses betwcen high and low prices. Advertising expenditures are higher, the
lower the selected price is. Tlre role of this random behaviour is to prevent the unin-
formed consumers from precisely predicting the actual price iu a rational expectationsequilibrium. Indeed, the seller would have no incentive to advertise if the uninformed
consumers were able to exactly forecast the equilibrium price.
Our equilibrium resembles Varian's (1980) model of sales in that prices are chosen
stochastically. 'I'his may be iuterpreted as the seller having randomly chosen sales. As in
our model, imperfect price information of consumers is important to generate Varian's
sales equilibria. Yet, in hi, model the strategic interaction between oligopolistic sellers
is the source of price randomization. In contrast, in our model of a monopolistic market
the ïeasibility of advertising is ultimately responsible for price dispersion. In the absence
of an advertising technology the monopolist would always charge a fixed price.
The literature distinguishes between `persuasive' and `informative' advertising. Ad-
vertising is said to be persuasive when it directly influences consumer preterences. Dixit
and Norman (19ó7) study a model of this sort and conclude that from a welfare view-
point it leads to excessive investment in advertising. Informative advertising conveys
information about existen~ e of products, prices, location of stores, and so on. T3utters
(1977), Grosstnan and Shapiro (1984), and our model fall into Lhis category. 13utters
(197ï ) and Urossman auJ 5liapiro (1934) assume that advcrtising providcs information
about the price of a product and its existence. Consumers cannot purchase a good
without receiving an ad. (n contrast, we assume that all consumers are well in(ormed
about the existence and the characteristics of the product; only information about its
price is írnperfect. This seerns to be relevant for many markets as a lrigh proportion of
newspaper advertising is directed at informing potential customers about sales of food,
clot}ting, and appliances. In our model the uninformed consumer's decision to visit the
seller depends on his price expectation. The interaction between expectation formation
and the sellcr's strategy plays a central role in the analysis of equilibrium.
Oligopolistic price advertising in a sequential search model is studied by Robert and
Stahl (1991). Their paper is closely related to ours in that it ïocuses on pure price
advertising. I'irms adopt a random pricing and advertising strategy and the consumer
either purchases the good after observing an ad or he follows a search stratcgy that is
characterized by some reservation price. As in Varian (1980), oligopolistic competition
gcncrates a disruutinuity ii~ t.hc firm's profit Cunction so that thc cyuilibriuni is in niixcdstrategies. In the case of a single seller their model would not exhibit price dispersion.
Indeed, all consumers have identical search costs in the Robert-Stahl model and by
advertising each firm seeks to undercut the price offers of its rivals. In contrast, in our
modcl consumcrs di([cr in thcir visiting cost and thc goal of monopolistic advcrtising is
to induce the Ligh cost consuuiers to visit the store. The observation that dit[erences
in consumer informatiou custs may lead to monopolistic price dispersion is similar to
Salop (1977). In his modcl the seller operates a number of rctail outlets in the market
and charges di(ferent priccs at different locations. In this way the market is split up
into submarkets and less eí}icient searchers end up paying a higher purchase price. We
assume that such a device for sorting consumers is not feasible since the seller offers the
good at a single location.
The following Section describes the model and defines the rational expectations equi-
librium. The existence of equilibrium and its basic properties are investigated in Section
3. Section 4 studies the wclfare implications of advertising. Ilere we show that the exis-
tence ofan advertising technology leads to a Pareto improvement; yet, from a second-best
viewpoint the equilibrium advertising level is less than socially efHcient. Comparative
statics results are contained in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
We consider a monopolistic seller who produces a single homogeneous good. The cost
of producing one unit of the good is constant and normalized to zero. There is a con-
tinuum of consumers each of whom will buy at most one unit of the good. Without
loss of generality we assurnc that the measure of consumers is normalized to unity. All
consumers have an identical valuation r) 0 for the good. Visiting the seller is costly;
before making a purclrase consumer d E [0,1] has to pay a cost dt. It is assumed that d
is uniformly distributed on [0,1] across the population of consumers. 1'his assumption
generates a simple demand structure and allows us to explicitly compute the impact of
advertising on demand. One possible interpretation is that the monopolist is located at
the center of some geographical market area and that dt represents the transportation4
cost of a couswner who li:cs tu tr:wel the distance d to buy Lhe good. Varyiug l enables
us to stucly how a change in the consumers' visiting cost affects the seller's pricing and
advertising behavior.
There are two groups of consumers, informed and uninformed. The informed con-
sumer observes the price p quoted by the monopolist. Hence, the informed consumer d
will go to the store if r - p~ dt. The uninformed consumer bases his decision on his
price expectation p~. He ~ isits the seller if r - p~ ~ dt and learns the actual price p upon
entering the store. At this stage the cost dt is sunk so that he will buy the good as long
aspGr.
A priori a fraction 0 G ry G 1 0[ consumers is always informed about the price charged
by the monopolist. Indcpendently of his type d, each consumer is eyually likely to be
perfectly inforrned. '1'he scller can increase the number of informed consurners through
advertising activities. Suppose the price advcrtisement reaches each individual consumer
with the same probability ~. 'Then the fraction of uninformed consumers is reduced to
(1 - a)(1 - ry) and the fraction ry(1 - a) }~ becomes informed. We assume that the
price advertise.ment is legally binding. The monopolist cannot induce consumers to pay
thc v;siting cost dl by aclvcrtisiug a low pricc and Lhcu upon Lbcir arrival clciuand a high
pricc.
We consider only paran,eter constellations such that r G 2l. '1'his rules out that the
monopolist will serve the entire market. Abstracting from such boundary cases helps
to simplify the analysis. For any price p E(0, r], the monopolist's demand depends on
the advertising intensity ~ and the uniformcd consumers' expectations p~ E[O, r] and is
given by [(ry(1 - a) ~- a)(r - p) ~(1 - y)(1 - a)(r - pe)]~t. Accordingly, his sales revenue
eyuals
P[r - (7(1 -.`) -f-.`)P- (1 -ry)(1 - ~)Pe]~t. (1)
The seller takes the expectation p~ as fixed. Of course, in eqnilibrium we will require
expectations to be rationa] which means that p~ has to be consistent with the pricing
and advertising strategy actually chosen by the seller. It is irnportant to notice that
Lbc rcvcnuc function is cuncave iu p as wcll as in a but uot joinLly conc-:wc in (p, a).5
Therefore, even when the costs of advertising are represented by sorne convex and in-
creasing function of a, the monopolist's overall problem is not concave and might have
multiple solutions. In fact, it will turn out that randomization by the seller constitutes
an important characteristic of the market equilibrium.
We procecd by first deriving the optimal pricing decision for a given advertising
strategy. Maximizing (1) with respect to p E[O,r] leads to the solution
r- 1-
P(~,Ii~) - min[ 7(1 - a)pe r]
(2) 2(7(1 - a) t a)
For pe G r and (1 -y)(1 -~) sufficiently large it becomes optimal for the seller to exploit
the uninformed consumers by charging the reservation price r. This strategy is no longer
optimal when the fraction of informed consurners is large enough. Moreover, in this case
p'(a,p~) is strictly decreasing in a. `I'hus choosing a high advertising intensity a can be
interpreted as the monopolist having a sale.
Substituting (2) into ( 1) gives the revenue function for given values of a and pe :
~(~ pe) - [r - (1 - a)(1 - 7)pe]~
4(?'(1 - ~) -f- a)t
if (1 - ry)(1 - 1) G r~(2r - p~), (3)
n(a.pe) -[r(1- -r)(1- a)(r - p~)]~i if (1- 7)(1- ~) ~ rl(~r -n~).
Determining the optimal advcrtising intensity a is complicated by the fact that II(a,p~)
is not concave in a. To cope with Lhis problern we assume that there is some finite uum-
ber n of advertising intensities among which the seller can choose. They are denoted
by ~;, i- 0, ..., n- 1, with ~o G ai G...a„-r G 1. The seller must pay the cost k;
when he selects advertising intensity a;. We denote by k-(k~,kr,...,k„-1) the vector
of advertising costs and assumc ku G kr G...k„-r. Also, we set ~o - ku - 0 which gives
the monopolist the frecdom not to advertisc his price. The assumption of a finite set of
feasible advertising levels enables us to apply a standard fixed point argument to prove
existence of equilibrium; the case of a continuous variable a may be approximated by the
lin~it n-~ oo. We allow tlic scllcr to adopt a random advcrtiaiug stratcgy rcpresentedby q E Q-{q E R"~ ~; q; - 1} such that q; is the probability of selecting a;. Now we
are ready to define a market equilibrium with rational consumer expectations.
Definition: (q', p~) is an equiliórium if
(i) q' E argmaxoEQ E;q;(If(a;,p~) - k;]; and
(~~) Pe - (~;qi(1 - ar)P`(~„p~))~~~;9~(I - ~~)).
Condition (i) states that the seller's choice of advertising intensities is profit max-
imizing. Indeed, by (i) one has q~ ~ 0 only if II(a;, p~) - k; ~ II(a„ p~ )- k~ for all
j- 0, ..., n- 1. Condition (ii) requires the uninCormed consumers' expectations to be
consistent with Bayes' rule. The consumer who has not been reached by an advertise-
ment will use this observation to update his beliefs. Conditional upon not receiving
an advertisenient, he concludes that the monopolist charges p'(~;,pe) with probability
9i(I - ~~)~(Ei4~(1 - ~i)).
3 Equilibrium Advertising
Befure studyiug LIw cquilil,riuu~ dcfined iu tl,e provious sectiuu, wc disregard fur a mo-
ment the maZOpolist's option to advertise. This will give us a reference point for our
further analysis. If there is no advertising, the seller will always charge the same price
p'(ao, p~) so that rational expectations require p'(ao,pe) - pe. Solving for p~ then yields
the equilibrium price
p - r~(1 t ry) (4)
The higher the fraction of a priori informed consumers, the lower is p. The intuition is
simply that the uninformed consumers' demand is completely inelastic so that demand
becomes more elastic wheii there are more informed consumers. When ry- 0, one
has p- r and the market effectively collapses. This is so because the seller would
optimally ask p- r from any consumer who arrives at his store. Quoting a lower price
cannot increase his demand as all consumers observe p only aíter entering the store.7
With rational expectations the consumers anticipate this pricing behavior and refrain
from visiting the seller. Indeed, this type of market break-down is well known from
the search literature (see, e.g. Stiglitz (1979)). To avoid the autarky equilibrium some
consumers have to be well ii~formed about prices, either exogenously or endogenously
through advertising.
We now return to the analysis of the advertising equilibrium by first investigating its
existence.
Proposition 1: There is an equilibrium (q', p~). Moreover, for ~~k~~ sujficiently small it
satisfies qa G 1, i.e. the seller advertises his price with posilive probability.
Proof: Define
~Pi(Pe) - argmaxyeQ D;q;[n(a;,P~) - ~;~;
iPs(q,Pe) - [~;q;(1 - )y)P~(~;,Pe)~~[~;q;(1 - ~;)~.
(5)
Clearly, ~p~ (.) is convex-valued and, by the Maximum Theorem, an u.h.c. correspondence
from P- {pe~0 G pe C r} into Q. Similarly, epz(.) is a continuous mapping from Q x P
into P bccause by (2), 0 C p'(a;, p~) c r for all p~ E P. As a resiilt, ~p - yo~ x ipz is a
convex-valued and u.h.c. correspondence from Q x P into itself. Thus, Kakutani's fixed
point theorem guarantees the existence of a fixed point (q', pe). By definition of ~p it is
easily seen that (q',pé) constitutes an equilibrium.
To prove the second part of the Proposition, we will show that q~ - 1 together with
part (ii) of the definition of equilibrium implies II(ao,p~) G II(a;,p~) for i 1 0. Clearly,
for ~~k~~ sufficiently small this contradicts optimality of q' -(1,0,...,0) as required by
part (i) of the definition.
By (ii), q~ - 1 and q~ - 0 for i~ 0 implies p~ - p`(ao, p~). Therefore one has pé - p,
as given by (4). By (3),n(~,P) - r2(27 - .~ry f ~)z
4(1 f ry)z(1'(1 - ~) f ~)t ~ (6)
As óII(~,P)Ióa ~ 0, this proves II(ao,P) C n(~„P) for i~ 0. Q.E.D.
Proposition 1 shows that the monopolist has an incentive to advertise if the resulting
cost is not too high. The intuition is that without advertising all consumers would expect
the seller to charge p. Given these expectations the seller can increase his sales revenue
by reducing the fraction of uninformed consumers and advertising a lower price. This
increases his demand because those consumers who observe the advertisement realize
that their expectations have been too pessimistic. Of course, with rational expectations
this cannot always be the case, which explains the following result.
Proposition 2: Any equitébriurn (q`,p~) satísftes qó ) 0, i.e. with positive probabílity
the seller does not advertise his price.
Proof: As y~ 0 the seller can certainly make positive profits. This implies p~ C r
in any equilibrium. Define a'(p~) by p`(a',p~) - p~. Then p'(a,p~) C pë if and only if
.~ ~ a'(p~) because p`(a, p~) is strictly decreasing in ~ whenever p'(~,pe) C r. Using (1)
and the Envelope Theorem one has óII(a,pe)~óa ~ 0 if and only if p'(~,p~) C p~. This
means II(a,p~) is decreasing in a for a c a'(p~) and strictly increasing only if a~ a'(p~).
According]Y II(a;, p~) 1 II(ao, p~) implies a; ~ a'(P~) and, therefore, P'(a;,P') C P~. ~
Suppose there is an equilibrium with q~ - 0 so that E;~u q~ - 1. Because k; 1 0,
equilibrium condition (i) implies II(~;,p~) ~ II(ao,p~) for all i such that q; ~ 0. By the
above argument this implies p`(a;,pe) C p~ for all i such that q~ ~ 0. As qo - 0, we ob-
tain [E;q;(1 - a,)P~(~.,Pr)]~[E~9;(1 -~t)) C p~, a contradiction to equilibriurn condition
(ii). This proves q~ 1 0 in any equilibrium. Q.E.D.9
The monopolist engage~s in advertising following a random strategy. Occasionally he
announces a`special offer', but with some chance he provides no price inforrnation and
chargea a high price. By randomly having a sale he keeps the uninformed consumera
uncertain about his price. It is easy to see why this must be the case in a rational
expectations equilibrium. In the absence of price randomness the uninformed consumers
would precisely forecast the equilibrium price. But then spending money on advertising
can no longer be profitable for the seller. This argument is similar to the observation of
Grossman and Stiglit2 (1980) that the equilibrium price in a capital market with rational
expectations cannot fully reveal the informed traders' private knowledge. Indeed, if this
were the case then no agent would have an incentive to spend resources on gathering
information. Therefore, there must be some exogenous source of noise which prevents
the equilibrium from being fully revealing. In our model the monopolist endogenously
generates such noise to maintain a role for advertising.
Proposition 3: l.et (q`,p~) Lr. an equilibriurn with qo G l. Then y'(a~,P~) 1 p~ )
p'(a;,p~) Jor all i ~ 0 such thal q; ~ 0. Moreover, p'(ao,pe) ~ P 1 P~-
Proof: The first part of the proof of Proposition 2 shows that q~ 1 0 implies p~ ~
p'(a;, p~) for all i~ 0. As a; c 1 for all i, equilibrium condition (ii) therefore necessitates
p'(~o,Pe) ~ Pe~
As P'(ao,P~) ~ P~, (2) and (4) imP1Y P~ C rI(1 f 1') - P. Because p'(ao,P~) is de-
creasing in pe, one obtains p'(ao,p~) ~ p'(ao,p) - p. Q.E.D.
The seller advertises his price only if he wants to inform consumers that they have
to pay less than they expect. This also means that the uninformed consumer who has
not observed the advertisement will be positively surprised when he arrives at the store.
The opposite is true if the seller happens to charge p'(ao, p~). Indeed, in this case some
of the uninformed consumers will ex post regret visiting the seller. Those consumers for10
whom r- p~ - dt ~ 0 ~ r - p'(ao, p~) - dt will find that they would have been better
off by not going to the sellcr. Yet, they realize this only after the cost dt is sunk.
As p~ G p the uninforrned consumers' price expectation is more optimistic than in the
reference equilibrium without advertising. Thus even when the seller selects advertising
intensity ao - 0, he faces a higher demand than in the equilibrium p. Therefore, he
optimally quotes a price p'(ao,p~) ~ p. Altogether Proposition 3 shows that advertising
has a dual impact on the seller's pricing behavior. Sometimes he will post a higher price
and somctimes a lower price than p.
4 Welfare
This Section investigatestlre welfare implications of advertising. We compare the equilib-
rium outcome with the hypothetical situation where the monopolist chooses the price p
because he is unable to communicate price information. It will turn out that advertising
generates a Pareto improvement; all market participants are better off when the seller
follows the random strategy described in the foregoing Section. We begin by considering
the seller. As our comparison is concerned with equilibrium payoffs, one cannot conclude
that the scller must gain simply because he has the option not to invest in advertising.
This argument would neglect the equilibrium interaction between the seller's strategy
and the consumers' expectatiou formation.
Proposition 4: Let (q', pe) be an equilibrium with q~ G 1. Then E;q;[II(a;,p~) - k;] ~
II(ao,p), i.e. the seller earras higher profits with than without advertising.
Proof: By Proposition 2 one has qó ~ 0 so that E;q;[II(~;,p~) - k;] - II(ao,p~). By
Proposition 3, p~ G p whenever qó G 1. Therefore, (3) implies II(~o,p~) ~ II(ao,P).
Q.E.D.
Since p~ G p, the seller attracts more uninformed consumers and so he can guarantee
himself higher profits. To investigate consumer welfare we define11
Vd(p) - max[r - p- dt, 0]. (7)
The function Vd(p) represents buyer d's utility when he either observes or expects that
the monopolist demands p. It will be important that Vd(.) is convex, which means that
consumers prefer price riskiness. This is a typical property of indirect utility functions
(see, e.g. Waugh (1944)). The expected utility of a consumer d who belongs to the
fraction ry of perfectly informed consumers equals E;q;Vd(p'(~;, p~ )). A buyer in tk~e group
of initially uninformed consumers observes the seller's price advertisement p'(a;, p~ ) with
probability a;; with probability (1-a;) he remains uninformed and expects p~. Therefore,
his expected equilibrium utility is E;q~[(1 - a;)Vd(p~) ~ a;Vd(p'(a;,p~))].
Proposition 5: Let (q',pe) 6e an equiliórium with q~ G 1. Then, E;q~Vd(p'(a;,pe)) ~
Vd(p) and E;q;[(1 -a;)Vd(pé) f~;Va(p~(~;,p~))] ? Vd(p) Jor al! d and the inequality holds
in óoth cases Jor d su~iciently small. That is, lhe eapected utility oJ all consumers is
higher with than without advertising.
Proof: First we will show that p~ 1 E;q;p'(a;,p~). Define the probability vectors z and
z' by
z; - 4n-~-t, zi - 9n-i-t(1 - a„-~-;)~Ei9~(1 - ai), (8)
wliere i- 0, ..., n-1. We show that z' first-order dorninates z. We proceed by induction.
Clearly zo - q;,-i ? 4~-~(1 -~„-1)~E~9; ( 1 - a;) - zó because 1- a; 1 1- a„-i for all i.
It remains to show that E;-~ z; ~ Ek-rz~ implies E~z; ~ E;z~ for all k G n- 1. Suppose,
for some k, E;z; G E;`z;, i.e.
l,i;jq~(1 - ~]) 1 ~~Zil~iqn-1-;(1 - ~n-1-~)' (9)12
As Ek-rz; ~ E;`-~z„ (9) implies
(~k-~zi)(~l9n-I-i(l - ~n-I-i)) J (~izi)(~i-~~in-1-i(f -~n-1-i)).
Simplifying ( 10) yields
k-1 . k-1 . Ei 9n-1-i(1 - ~n-i-k) ~ Ei 9n-I-i(1 - ~n-1-;),
(10)
a contradiction to (1- an-i-k) C(1- a„-r-;) for all i G k. Now, by first order dominance
and equilibrium condition (ii) one obtains
Pe - ~izjP(~n-~-i,Pc) ~ EiziP (an-t-i,P~) - Ei9iP(~i,Pe), (11)
because P'(an-r-i,P~) C P~(~n-i-i,P~) forj 1 i.
By convexity of Vd(.) and our above result we get
~i4~Vd(P(~irPe)) 1 Vd(Ei9~P (~i,Pe)) 1 Vd(Pe)~ (12)
As p~ G p by Proposition 3, one has Vd(p~) 7 Vd(p) for all d with strict inequality for
d small enough. This together with (12) proves the first claim of Proposition 5. The
second claim follows directly from Proposition 3 since ao - 0 and p'(a;,p~) G p~ G p for
all i~ 0 such that q; ~ 0. Q.E.D.
Propositions 4 and 5 establish that the feasibility of price communication makes all
agents better off. The source of this welfare gain is the surplus generated by the increase
in the monopolist's production. Nonetheless, equilibrium output is still below the social
optimum, which would be attained by setting p- 0 and not spending resources on
advertising. Of course, this first-best outcome ia incompatible with monopolistic pricing.
But even when the pricing rule (2) is taken as fixed, the equilibrium advertising level13
fails to yield a second-best or constrained welfare optimum. The monopolist selects a to
maximize his profit ignoring the impact on consumer welfare. Since p'(a,p~) decreases
with a, consumer surplus is the higher, the higher the advertising intensity chosen by the
seller. Yet, in any equilibrium with advertising the seller ia indifferent between choosing
some a; ~ 0 and ao - 0 and he sets q; C 1 and q~ ] 0. The divergence between
the private and social gains leads to underinvestment in advertising. Without directly
interfering in the seller's l~ricing decisions, welfare may be increased by a subsidy on
advertising expenditures.
5 Comparative Statics
This Section provides some comparative statics insights into the nature of the equilib-
rium. We consider exogenous changes in the seller's advertising cost k, the visiting cost
parameter t, and the number of fully informed consumers ry.
Proposition 6: Let (q', p~) 6e an equilibrium corresponding to k- k' and let (q", p~')
be an equilibrium corresponding k- k". If k;' ~ k; for al! i 1 0 and q~ G 1, then
p~" 1 p~, i.e. an increase in advertising costs increases the uninformed consumers' price
expectation.
Proof: If q~' -], then p~' - p so that p~ G}"i - p~' by Proposition 3. If q~' C 1, there is
a j~ 0 such that q~' ) 0. Also, Proposition 2 shows that q~" ~ 0 and qó 1 0. Therefore,
equilibrium condition (i) implies that for some j~ 0
n(a„Pe) - n(ao,P~) ~ k,, n(a„P~')- n(~o,P~') - k;. (13)
As k~ ~ k~, onoohtaiuti ~~'(P~') ~ ~i(P~), whcrc ~(~(p,) - l1(a~,p,)-If(au,P~).'I'o provc
the Proposition, we will sliow that ~i'(p~) ~ 0. Using (1) and the Lnvelope 1'heorem, one
obtains 81l(a,P~)~JP~ --(1 - 7)(1 -~)P~(~,P~)~t. As ~o - 0, this implics
~~(P~) - ( 1 - ry)~P~(~o,P~) - (1 - ai)P (~i,P~)~~t , 0 (14)14
because p'(ao,p~) ) p'(~~,p~) and 0 C a~ C 1. E.D. Q.
With higher advertising costs the uniformed consumers' equilibrium expectations be-
come more pessimistic. They will be convinced that the seller is less likely to hold a
sale. Indeed, it is easy to see that in a probabilistic sense the equilibrium (q",p~') in-
volvea less advertising than (q', p~). By (3), p'(a;, p~') C p'(a;,p~) since p~' ~ p~. That
is, the higher the advertising cost the lower is the price charged by the seller for any
given advertising intensity. If nonetheless the uninformed consumer expects to pay a
higher price, it must be the case that the seller puts more weight on lower advertising
intensities, which are associated with higher prices. In the special case n- 2, where the
seller can choose only not to advertise or to advertise with intensity a~, this argument
directly shows that q~' 1 q~; i.e. higher information costs make the monopolist more
likely to refrain from advertising.
Proposition 7: Let (q',p~) be an equilibrium corresponding to t- i' and let (q",p~')
be an equilibrium corresponding to t- t". Ij t" ~ t' and qó C 1, then pe' ) p~, i.e.
an incrcase in the consumr.rs' visitiny cost increases the uninformed consumer.v' prir,e
expectation.
Proof: Let II'(a,p~) and II"(a,p~) denote the seller's sales revenue corresponding to t'
and t", respectively. As II"(a,p~) - II'(a,p~)t'jt", the increase in t changes the seller's
payoff from II'(~;,pe) - k; to II'(a,pe)t'~t" - k;, By an af~ine trans[ormation of payoffs
q~' thus maximizes E;q;[II'(a;,pe) - k;t"~t']. Accordingly, an increase in t has the same
effect as an increase in k so that Proposition 6 applies. Q.E.D.
As the proof of Proposition 7 reveals, an increase in consurner visiting costs is eyuiva-
lent to an increase in advertising costs in the following sense: If (q", p~') is an equilibrium15
for given parameter values (t", k'), then it is also an equilibrium under the parameter
constellation (t', k") with k" - k't"~t'. Perhaps surprisingly, the monopolist reacts to an
increase in the consumers' cost of obtaining price information by advertising less fre-
quently. But, this is so because his sales revenue is lower the higher is t. Accordingly,
advertising yields a lower rate of return, [II(a;,p~) - II(ao, p~)]~k;, when t is raised.
Proposition 8: Let (q', p~) 6e an equiliórium corresponding to ry- y' and let (q", p~`)
6e an equiliórium corresponding to y- ry". IJ y" ~ y' and q~ C 1, then p~' G p~,
i.e. an increase in the fraction oJ perfectly injormed consumers lowe.rs the uninjormed
consumers' price ezpectation.
Proof: Let ii'(a,p~) and lI"(a,p~) denote the seller's sales revenue corresponding to ry'
and ry", respectively. As 0 G q~ C 1, there is a j 1 0 such that q~ 1 0 and
n~(~i,P~) - n~(~o,P~) - ki. (15)
By (1) and the Envelope Theorem, 8II~8ry - ( 1 - a)p'(a,p~)(p~ - p'(a,p~))~t. By
Proposition 3, p'(ao,p~) ~ P~ ~ P~(~l,P~). Therefore, 8[II(a„p~) - II(ao,p~)]~óry ~ 0 so
that
n~~(~i,P~) - n~~(~o,P~) ~ ki. (16)
Now suppose p~' 1 p~. The proof of Proposition 6 shows that II(a„p~) - II(ao,p~) is
increasing in p~. Therefore
n~~(~i,P~~) - n~~(~o,P~~) ~ ki, (17)
a contradiction to equilibrium condition (i) and the fact that qó' ) 0 by Proposition 2.
Q.E.D.
Unlike the two previous results, Proposition 8 fails to have a straightforward impli-
cation regarding the change in the seller's advertising strategy q'. The reason is that16
TABLE 1
Equilióriurn jor n - 2, r- 2, t- 1, al - 0.75, ki - 0.01
ry 9ó P~ P~(ao,Pé) P~(~t,P~)
0.1 0.1842 1.512 2 1.071
0.2 0.1376 1.433 2 1.071
0.3 0.141`2 1.345 1.764 1.Ofi9
0.4 0.1663 1.276 1.543 1.064
0.5 0.1982 1.221 1.389 1.056
0.6 0.2539 1.177 1.274 1.046
0.7 0.4106 1.144 1.183 1.035
0.8 1 1.111 1.111 -
the r.h.s. of equilibrium condition (ii) depends negatively on ry. Therefore, a decrease in
p~ does not necessarily imply that advertising is intensified and the effect on q' remains
unclear. Indeed, the parameter ry has two opposing effects on the profitability of adver-
tising. On the one hand, for a given expectation p~ an increase in ry raises the return
rate [II(a;, p~) -1T(ao,p~)]~k;. The reason is that the seller's profit írom charging a price
p'(a;,p~) C p~ is higher if iiiore consumers are informed about this fact. The contrary
is the case when he charges p'(~o,p~) ~ p~. As a result, [II(a;,p~) - II(ao,p~)]~k; and
y are positively related. On the other hand, Proposition 8 shows that the uninformed
consumers' expectation p~ is more optimistic the higher ry is. This reduces the impact of
advertising on demand and so [TI(~;, p~) - II(ao, p~)]~k; is decreased.
To illustrate what happens, we resort to a numerica.l example. We consider the case
n- 2 with ~1 - 0.75. The other parameter values are r - 2, t- 1, and k~ - 0.01.
Table 1 reports the equilibrium outcome (q',p~) and the seller's pricing strategy as
a function of y. It turns out that in this example the se]ler sets p`(~o,pë) - r if
ry G 0.23. With probability q~ he charges the ceservation price to exploit the uninformed
consumers. Interestingly, we observe that q~ decreases with ry as long as p'(ao,p~) - r,
i.e. the likelihood of advertising increases when there are more informed consumers. The
intuition is that exploiting tlie uninformed consumers becomes less profitable and so the17
monopolist advertises p'(a~,p~) C r more often. This tendency is reversed when y is
large enough and p'(ao,p~) G r. Then ry and q~ are positively related. This appears
plausible since the provision of price information is of importance only for a fraction
1- ry of consumers. In fact, for ry~ 0.78 the monopolist sets qó - 1 and refrains from
advertising.
6 Conclusion
This paper studies price advertising in a monopolistic market. Through advertising the
monopolist informs those consumers who otherwise would not observe his price. This
is profitable for the seller only if he quotes a price below the uninformed consurners'
price expectation. Given rational expectations, this cannot always be the case. We
demonstrate that this leads to an equilibrium in which the monopolist. randomizes over
prices and advertising inteusities. This kind o! price dispersion is a consequence of eyui-
librium interactions between consumer expectations and the monopolist's strategy. It
differs from models of oligopolistic Bertrand competition where discontinuities in the
firms' profits are well-known to generate mixed strategy equilibria in the sellers' pricing
game. Indeed, one might suspect that a monopoly is less likely to be characterized by
price dispersion than an oligopoly. Stigler (1961, p.223) argues that "from the manufac-
turer's viewpoint, uncertainty concerning his price is clearly disadvantageous, the cost of
search is a cost of purchase, and consumption will be smaller the greater the dispersion
of prices". In our model this is true only when the monopolist is unable to communicate
price information. In this case his profit function is strictly concave in price, which makes
randomizing suboptimal. This property of the profit function is destroyed by the option
to advertise. As a result, profit maximization leads to stochastic pricing and advertising
behaviour.18
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